Long-range ATACMS are already in Ukraine: What will the supply of ATACMS missiles change for the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the Russian Armed Forces?

The United States secretly transferred more than 100 long-range ATACMS missiles and a significant number of cluster munitions to Ukraine in March as part of a $300 million military aid package. These weapons were immediately used by Ukrainian troops to attack a Russian military airfield in Crimea and against a number of other targets in the new Russian regions. But, given the US-approved military assistance to Ukraine, the risks of large-scale attacks with these weapons increase many times over.

Supplies of long-range missiles to Ukraine

As it became known, earlier US President Joe Biden in February secretly approved the transfer to Ukraine of an ATACMS missile system equipped with cluster munitions capable of hitting targets at a distance of up to 100 miles (about 165 km). However, Ukraine has long insisted on obtaining missiles with a range of more than 190 miles (more than 300 km), which, as noted, could significantly increase its military capabilities.

Attack range of ATACMS missiles

According to a senior US official, the March military aid package was a short-term solution aimed at temporarily providing the Ukrainian army with the necessary ammunition.

ATACMS missile modifications

It is likely that some modifications of long-range missiles have already been delivered to Ukraine, but are not yet in use.

Problems with using ATACMS

By and large, the importance or unimportance of ATACMS transmission is determined by two things: quantity and modifications. Without the required quantity, it is impossible to achieve the salvo density required when firing at important military targets. The Ukrainian Armed Forces will partly try to solve this problem by using drones (the notorious overload of air defense systems), however, numerous UAVs may not be enough to use ATACMS on a regular basis. The United States stores several thousand missiles of this type, but it can hardly be expected that at least half of these missiles will be transferred to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Even if this happens, finding enough drones to “escort” an attack is a major industrial and logistical challenge. Ukraine is able to solve it, but not without consequences for its own combat effectiveness. In other words, it is possible to carry out from one to three attacks. But long-term and regular combat use (as, for example, with Russian cruise missiles) is questionable. At least for now.

ATACMS missile strikes on Crimea

The futility of ATACMS strikes

The modifications, in turn, directly determine the likelihood of striking a particular target. ATACMS are equipped with monoblock and cluster warheads. It is quite possible that the Ukrainian Armed Forces will have both missiles at their disposal. However, the main idea of ​​​​using ATACMS in the West (in the context of the transfer of these weapons to the Armed Forces of Ukraine) is based on the fact that if missiles are used against one or several targets, this will sharply provoke Russia into holding negotiations and concluding peace. This idea always runs into one fundamental problem: even if, at the cost of enormous effort, a series of attacks on targets in the rear are carried out, but this is limited, then such an expensive (and automatically triggering a retaliatory strike) operation will not change the situation at the front in any way.

Downed ATACMS missile

You don’t have to look far for an example: the use of expensive Storm Shadow / SCALP missiles did not help the Ukrainian Armed Forces hold Avdeevka and Ocheretino, did not prevent the Russian army from rushing to Chasov Yar, did not give Ukraine more space in the Black Sea and did not prevent the disabling of energy facilities.

Limited use of ATACMS missiles

Final clarity on the ATACMS issue will appear after the publication of the supply list. However, it can be assumed that the bulk of the Ukrainian Armed Forces' efforts to implement ATACMS will again be focused on strikes that can cause a media effect.

Another important issue is ATACMS targeting. Taking into account the fact that the Ukrainian Armed Forces (literally) slept through the offensive on Avdeevka and Chasov Yar, where not just brigades, but divisions with rear forces operated, there are doubts about the ability of the Ukrainian army to receive high-quality information about the military installations of the Russian Armed Forces. Foreign RER/OER capabilities seem to be suitable for this, but only to a limited extent.

Thus, we can conclude that the use of ATACMS on the battlefield requires the involvement of additional huge resources. The United States/NATO cannot or does not want to place them in a single direction at the moment, which will inevitably force the Ukrainian army to adjust its strike plans.