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The disaster at Thessaloniki. Yak-42. Aerosvit. 1997 year.

The disaster at Thessaloniki. Yak-42. Aerosvit. 1997 year.



NEWSLETTER OF accidents involving aircraft Yak-42 UR42334 LVIV aviation enterprises. Flying AEW-241 on the route Odessa - Thessaloniki 17.12.97


  1. Full information about the vessel
  2. Information about downloading and ship the balance
  3. Information on weather conditions "Macedonia" Airport
  4. Information about the location and the very clash
  5. Place the debris and factors vizhivaemosti
  6. Analysis: General provisions for the collapse of
  7. Overview of confusion in the cockpit
  8. The study of the effectiveness of the Manager
  9. Key facts about the crash of the Yak-42
  10. The main causes of the disaster


Aircraft UR-42334. flying AEW-241. the operating organization - Ukrainian Airlines "AEROSVIT"Regular flight schedule from Odessa International Airport. Ukraine International Airport Lounge" Macedonia ", Greece, comes in to land on the runway 16 accordance with the procedure VOR / ILS (VHF omnidirectional radio range / instrument landing system). Performing flight in the second round, in the absence of the field of view of the runway, with the deviation from the expected trajectory, crashed in a mountainous area that has led to the deaths of all on board and the total destruction of the aircraft.


Factual information


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In I9: I2 *: 43 "MST (Coordinated Universal Time) 17 1997 December flight, the AEW-241. performed by Ukrainian airline "Aerosvit" aircraft Yak-42, regular passenger flights scheduled from the International airport Odessa International Port "Macedonia", Greece, took place at night on instrument flight rules (PG1P) crashed in mountainous terrain. AEW-24I did VOR DME (equipment) a second landing on the runway 16, but significantly deviated from the schemes of the second steepest in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC). The scene was not far from the city, 37 nautical miles southwest of the airport Thessaloniki.

The aircraft experienced a collision at an altitude of 3 300 S.U.M.1 feet near the summit ("The thread towers") in the course of 290 °. 20 ° right turn at a position with a raised part of the aircraft on 15-20 °, an indicated airspeed 0,347 Staha (216 minds. 400 km / h) "The aircraft was completely destroyed, and all crew members (X) and passenger (62 ) received fatal injuries.

IAC / LSF also gave AHW-24I instructions permitted the northern border in the waiting area and pointed out the approach sequence, in which the AEW-24I was number two on the route of arrival Lamba 1F and approach, VOR-DME, ILS to runway 16 ( Appendix 12). Messaging occurs in normal mode up to the area of ​​Lambi. In the future, however, the lack of understanding of the flock grow, n connection with the cabin crew, as well as management, have been violated.

Flight was not followed by "arc" trajectory Lamba 1F (see Appendix 4) according to the drones and ATC (air traffic control), instead he went for a course THESSALONIKI / DRIVE (THS / NDB), as outlined in yellow in Appendix I. As a result of deviation ZSG1S double triggers an alarm (18: 47: 24 "and 18: 49: 41"). The crew did not respond to any of the alarm except for comment about the mountains in the first case. The aircraft flew a course for beacon, at least twice in an attempt to install the course of the beacon. However, no written instructions for completing the transition to the course and capture the beacon (using the 'arc' and the need for rapid decline), the flight crew was unable to establish a stabilized approach.

As a result, AEW-24I came to the borders of the airport at too high altitude and passed over the airport and recording on ASO shows that the crew due to loss of orientation did not even realize it.

Manager told them 18: 54 ': 37 ", that they have passed the airport. The negotiations of the crew inside the cabin show that they are disoriented, and experiencing confusion about the rate at which should continue the flight, n in 18: 55 they asked the IAC / ADP (aerodrome control tower) "rate". Manager replied that they were not heard and asked AEW-24I contact with the approach control frequency at 120.8. Changing the frequency has been confirmed by the flight crew.

As soon as the AEW-24I left the airport area, they have reported to date 150 * and noted the request of the Manager, their height 1500 feet "request dispatcher

information whether the AEW-24I south of Thessaloniki on the radiogram 150e. AEW-241 confirmed "radiograms /50°".MAK/11DH received the message and instructed the crew to continue to climb in the external circuit of the aerodrome to 6000 feet (pressure reduced to \ an equal Sea 1035). Resolution has been confirmed AEW-241 in 18: 56 ': 12 ". Further, the MAC / 11DH gave them instructions to stay in the south waiting area at an altitude of 6000 feet and continue on 150 from a zone of the outer contour of the airport with a climb up to 6000 feet. After that, IAC / LSF turned his attention to the flight O.EG. incoming and area of ​​the airport.

In 18: 57: 58 "IAC / LSF have AEW-241 continue to climb up to 6000 feet," Make flight right in the direction of the joint venture St / BOP ". AEW-241 confirmed this to specify the message" Rotate Right naprav.1enie servants. MRC showed that the confusion in the cockpit and on the continued loss of orientation question testified flight instructor (IL1) "where to go?" and dissatisfied replica flight engineer (B / E) "Do not cry '(KRM 46 with 18: 56': 46" for 18: 57: 35 "). IAC / LSF requested AEW-241 confirm the direction of SLM BOP (TSL = beacon Thessaloniki . SLM) at an altitude of 6000 feet, which was confirmed by the flight crew

LOGO It was after the time the crew attempted to tune in the VOR and continue to turn at CJ1M. The commander stated (ASO * 49 with 18: 58 ': 49 "for 18: 57: 19") - "So, what course to follow, look," the co-pilot (C / I) - "Right. He'll BOP" Commander (R) - "I set up ARGG '(ATM - Automatic Direction Finder), the flight instructor (I / P) -" to adjust the BOP. Take a course at the BOP, go to the thief, "Captain (R) -" For a thief? So on the left (tune? move?). "

Manager inquiry by AEW in I8: 59 ': 20 ". AEW said:" 6000-foot-five miles from the servants. IAC / LSF confirmed: "Roger, set gramophones at the station? Tell installed gramophones at the station?". AEW-241 said: "the establishment of radiogram." In 18: 59 *: 46 "IAC / LSF confirmed AEW-241" Keep 6000 feet "and instructed them to" report SLM / BOP '. AEW-241 said "Save 6000 feet, let servants.

After that, in the cockpit even more confusion has arisen regarding the installation of BOP. and the flight instructor asked a question about the health of the VOR signal. In 19: 00 ': 11 "a crew member said," Come on 6000 feet, Alex. " IAC / LSF again sought confirmation from the AEW-24I, that they support the height of 6000 feet and received an affirmative response from the flight crew. While at the same time, MRC has shown that they have not yet reached 6000 feet ("Entering the 6000, Alex"). In 19: 00: 20 "IAC / LSF narrated:" Stay 6000, 241 let MICRA thief. " AEW-241 again answered in the affirmative: "You understand, inform St CAVIAR BOP ... AEW. The cockpit flight instructor (and / 11) once said, "hold out, hold out please", and Commander (R) said, "I can not." Flight data recorders showed (PSC). that the flaps at this time were set at an angle 20 °. and the flight continued in the climb, but there were difficulties in reaching the required height

In 19: 00: 38 "to continue negotiations within the cockpit that the flight" was mostly busy setting and Decoder aviation equipment in the cockpit. 19: 01: 08 "IAC / LSF again made the request:

"AEW-241, passed you on the SLM in the direction MICRA Worth" AEW-24I replied that they "move toward a servant. In 19: 01: 34" appear VOR was set up and co-pilot said: "outer loop". In 19: 01: 52 "the commander said," Flaps on the remove 20 °. Keep them in position. "

Manager requested location AEW-24I n 19: 02 ": 19". and the flight crew replied: "Mestopoyaozhenie ten miles from the SLM. Dispatcher: "Whether you are outside the boundaries of the outer loop SLM to the north?" AEW-241 responded: "Done". MAKL1DH asked: "radiograms 344 station" AEW-241 replied: "radiograms are not a complete answer lava dispatcher. After switching to the transfer of the team manager of domestic flights in 19; 02 *: 56 "handed AEW-24I team" ... continue to move in a northerly direction, the decline during the course north to 4500 foot pressure reduced to sea level at the rate of the north 1035 ", - In conversation inside the cockpit was repeated" The course is to the north, the northern tide wait "and then AEW-24I He said IAC / LSF "continue to move" north me waiting with a reduction in 4500, pressure 1035 ".

In 19: 03 ': 26 "IAC / I 1DH again requested AHW-24I. Whether they are north of the SLM AEW-241 said." Yes, to the north of the SLM. At the same time, the co-pilot in the cockpit said: 'He asks if we are to the north. " After receiving an affirmative response manager in 19: 03 ': 43 "made an indication:" AEW-241, you are squeezed, the continuing decline in 3500 foot pressure 1035 allowed VOR-DME-DL runway 16 inform establishing an J1J13 number one "( LLZ - ​​beacon). The crew replied: "Zanichayu 3500 1035 foot pressure notify interfacing LLZ runway 36 ... 16".

After this conversation the crew inside the cockpit radio frequencies concerned, heading, altitude and commented pilot instructor "So ... we go 270 °", and later this was confirmed by the second pilot, who stated: "The course 270 ° we go."

In 19; 05 ': 00 "the commander asked for pi lot instructor:" You, Alex, give him a course and altitude. "This was followed by further discussion in the cab'

C / P: * What is the ATM? "Does the radar?"

Commander: "Tell him ... tell him to vector."

/ P: "Does the ATM? This, this," "What's on the second (PRA)?"

B / E: "On the first ATM setup."

P / E: "What a setting on the second"

"345 (frequency SLM / ATM). Yes, 240 ... 270".

Commander: "You add (power)," C / P: "Speed, speed."

In 19: 05 ': 30 "the dispatcher asked again the position of AEW-241 and crew replied:" The situation is now ... 8 miles DME from the SLM. "Manager said:" Confirm your location to the north of the SLM 8DMET crew replied: "Done" . Then in 19: 05 ': 58 "Manager said:" 241 understand you continue to VOR-DME, ILS approach, let the installation due to the LLZ. " The crew replied: "Well, the establishment of LLZ runway 16".

In 19: 06 *: 12 "said Commander (MRC):" Stop. I do not understand what you choose? How do we follow the course? "

The co-pilot said: "Two seven-zero." The instructor said: * We are following. "The commander said again:" What do you choose? ". A flight instructor suggested:" Let's go, do a U-turn on 160.

At this point, the PFR revealed that the course was indeed 270e. The flight crew continued to comment on the height, speed and course and eventually the captain ordered the crew: "Request vectoring".

In 19: 07: 50 AEW-24I made a request: "Macedonia AEW-241, if possible ask for vectoring to the runway 16". Manager working with another domestic flight, and said: "AEI'-241 again?" The crew repeated "Please vectoring direction." Manager said: "There is no radar guidance. Sir, no. We can not, we can not provide radar vectors.

Follow BOP-NLS-DME approach to BIU1 16 ". AEW-24I said, "I confirm." MLK / PCB instructed: "Notify the reception signal from the LLZ runway 16, 3500 feet." On this crew replied, "Roger, LLZ tell you." This radio communication with ATC accompanied by a discussion of the problems inside the cab navigation, operation of navigation equipment, determine the route, where they were, etc. up to 19: 09 ": 38", when MLC / PCB requested the position again AEW-24I. The crew replied: "Location ... 28 miles. " After that, the controller asked: "Got it, AEW, you may perform a VOR-DME, ILS approach 167. Inside the cabin the MRC registered comments: "You have fulfilled the runway 16T," Well, where are we going? ". After that, the crew manager said: 'You understand LEI IAC / PCB asked: "AEW-241 you are familiar with the scheme BOP-NLS-DME approach?" He said: "Now ... BOP to perform ... 3500 confirm feet? " Manager said, "Yes, Sir, set the reception from the LLZ ILS 3500 feet, then follow the ILS approach to runway 16 to a minimum, to set in writing a minimum." AEW-241 replied "Good"

Between 19: 10 ': 38 "for 19: 10': 48" crew continued the discussion in the cockpit of the difficulties in navigation and orientation, and the instructor was made the remark: "Well, Alex, let's orient ourselves, we follow the outer contour of the locator on the rate 210 °, so where should locator? " The commander said: "It is back." An unidentified voice said, "... look at the scheme." The co-pilot said: "We must turn to the left." Then the conversation went about setting up an ATM and there was some confusion as to what ATM has been installed on 345 (Thessaloniki drive.) And what conclusion on the indicator.

In 19: 10 flight engineer (B / S) stated that the ATM is installed, and the co-pilot said, "including on the radar." Then the commander said, "Now, we do turn to the right, head for the radar." This was followed by: "Hey, let's go back to the original state flaps," "Let's increase the speed," "increases the speed, remove the flaps", and finally the co-pilot said: "flaps retracted".

In 19: 10: 58 IAC / PCB requested height AEW-241, but in the Greek language. AEW-241 said: "3500 feet '. Manager returned to radio traffic with the question: "Got it, you set the reception from the LLZ?" The immediate response from the crew are not followed, but inside the cabin copilot said, "Take it right," and the commander said, "Now take a right." After that AEW-241 manager said: "Turn right at the lighthouse.

In 19: 12: 08 "for 4 seconds will sound signal ZSPS. The instructor said," Turn the speed ... OK? ". The flight engineer said: "Normally".

In 19: 12 ': 13 "IAC / php made Niton" LEN "number one continue VOR DME ILS approach, at a minimum, continue to inform them of approaching the outer marker." The crew replied: "Report of the external token." After some time, the MAC / PCB asked: "AEW-241 you see the field?" At this point, once again sounded the ZSPS. followed by alarmed voices inside the cabin: 'continuing to climb, climb "," On the lamp is lit (indicator) "dangerous ground". "How much did you say to climb", "How much you told me to climb?". It was the last message to the MRC.

In 19: 12: 43 signal ZSPS disconnected. MAKPHD tried to call AEW-241 up to 19: 20: 19. By that time, we were made aware of the military radar and alerted search and rescue services.

Because of bad weather the crash of the aircraft was found three days later. It was in an unpopulated wooded and hilly terrain at an altitude of 3300 feet MSL


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