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                                                                                                March 07 2017

Statement by Federal Air Transport Agency of the possible causes of the disaster in the Altai, is an attempt to pressure on the MAC and the spread of speculation about the causes of the accident in the Altai.


March 3 2017, the Federal Air Transport Agency issued a statement (httr: // іd = 3344?), Where the said violation of the pilot, which, according to authorities, could lead to disaster. AOPA-Russia would like to state the following.
In accordance with Russian legislation the causes of the accident investigating special commission of the Interstate Aviation Committee (IAC). Paragraph 2.6 Regulation the investigation of accidents and incidents in civil aircraft in the Russian Federation (PRAPI) said that making public statements about the investigation and the possible causes, the Commission is authorized only. Information published Rosaviation, nothing more than speculation and cynical juggling with facts. We believe that the publication of the application - an attempt to pressure on public opinion in order to create a negative attitude towards the ANI and died in the crash, as well as an attempt to pressure on the Commission to investigate the accident. We also consider it necessary to publish the point of view of AOPA-Russia put forward "suggestions" Rosaviation:


1. Overdue medical report.

Dmitry Rakitskiy had a medical report 1-class, the validity of which, in accordance with Federal Aviation Regulations "Medical examination of the flight, traffic control, flight attendants, students and candidates entering the educational institutions of civil aviation", approved by order of the Ministry of Transport from April 22 2002, the N 50 (FAP-50), is one year, and which expired a few days before the accident. This flight was carried out for the purpose of general aviation (GA) for which performance is sufficient medical report 2-class, which, in accordance with the FAP-50 with less volume of medical examinations and reduced requirements for health reasons, is issued for a period of two years. Thus, the health status of the aircraft commander of the requirements of air law to complete this flight.


2. Flight to unequipped aircraft floats.

Point 3 under "Additional conditions, constraints, and information for R66» data card to the Type Certificate ST337-R66, issued by the IAC found that the "Flying over water without a set of floats away from the coastline, exceeding the planning distance in autorotation, banned ". In accordance with the AFM helicopter R66 aerodynamic quality of the autorotation is 5.5: 1. The width of the lake at the site of the AP is 3 km. Thus, even in the middle of the lake it was enough to be at the height of 270 meters to safe landing in autorotation to the shore of the lake. This is the usual height of the flight, which, according to the data map, do the floats are not required for this flight. Based on the logic Rosaviation any flights crossing the river or other body of water, without the presence of floats in a helicopter Robinson R-66, impossible.


3. Resolution of the Reserve for takeoff and landing.

In accordance with paragraph 40 Federal Rules of use of airspace (PT TTI) "Airspace users are obliged to use airspace in restricted areas and zones of flying ... get permission persons on whose behalf such established areas". As is known, the reserve officer allowed the landing of the helicopter on the cordon, and the subsequent rise. The current legislation does not provide air crew duty to find out the internal procedures for the authorization from the Reserve staff. Also, as a motorist should not receive permission to pass the intersection at the head of the Interior Ministry, but rather indicate the traffic police.


4. The lack of notification.

Pilots operating flights to the accident site to confirm the absence of two-way VHF communications with Air Traffic Services (ATS), at altitudes up to 2000 meters. This airspace is served by local control station (TIR) ​​"Barnaul", part of the branch "Air Navigation Western Siberia", Federal State Unitary Enterprise "State ATM Corporation" Russian aviation enterprises subordinate.
PT TTI in force at the time of the accident, was allowed to make a notification on the radio, at the same time responding to the notification PT TTI do not provide. Given the fact that the notification could be made without receipt of the TIR response, the statement that the notification has not been sent is unfounded. It is also known that the receipt or non-receipt of notice by the ATS unit has not served as a factor in the development of the accident - the event said the witness.
Thus, AOPA-Russia believes that none of these factors could affect the development of the accident. We propose to respect the laws of the Russian Federation, the Commission of Inquiry, as well as to the memory of fallen into a catastrophe, and to refrain from premature populist statements until after the official investigation.


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